We derive exact optimal solutions for the problem of optimizing revenue in single-bidder multi-item auctions for uniform i.i.d. valuations. We give optimal auctions of up to 6 items; previous results were only known for up to three items. To do so, we develop a general duality framework for the general problem of maximizing revenue in many-bidders multi-item additive Bayesian auctions with continuous probability valuation distributions. The framework extends linear programming duality and complementarity to constraints with partial derivatives. The dual system reveals the geometric nature of the problem and highlights its connection with the theory of bipartite graph matchings. The duality framework is used not only for proving optimality, but perhaps more importantly, for deriving the optimal auction; as a result, the optimal auction is defined by natural geometric constraints.
INTRODUCTION
The problem of maximizing revenue in multi-dimensional Bayesian auctions is one of the most prominent ones within the area of Mechanism Design. Intuitively, the problem deals with settings where an auctioneer wants to sell a number of items to some potential buyers (bidders) . Each bidder has a value for every item; this is the maximum price that she is willing to pay to get the item and it is a private value. The value of a set of items is simply the sum of the values of the items in the set. The bidders submit their values and the auctioneer must decide, perhaps with randomization, what items to allocate to each player and how much to charge each one of them for this transaction. The seller has some prior (incomplete) knowledge about how much each player values the items, captured by a (joint) probability distribution over the space of all possible valuations. However, since the actual values are private and only known to the bidders themselves, assuming standard selfish game-theoretic behavior, the players would lie and submit false bids if this is to increase their personal gain. The goal is to design auction protocols that maximize the total expected revenue of the seller, by also ensuring the truthful participation of the bidders.
For the single-dimensional case where only one item is to be auctioned among the players, the seminal work of Myerson [1981] has completely settled the problem. His solution is simple and elegant: the optimal auction is deterministic and easy to describe by a "virtual valuations" transformation and reduction to a social welfare maximization problem which can be solved using the well-studied VCG auction [Nisan 2007; Hartline and Karlin 2007] .
Unfortunately, for the many-items setting with additive valuations these elegant properties and results do not hold in general. It is very likely that there is no simple closed-form description of optimal revenue auctions, especially in a unified way similar to Myerson's solution. However, for the most commonly studied probability distributions, such as the uniform and normal distribution, we would like to have such clear, analytic descriptions of the optimal auctions, or at least algorithms-preferably simple and intuitive-that compute optimal auctions (their allocation and payment functions). But we are far from such a goal. There exists no interesting continuous probability distribution for which we know the optimal auction for more than three items. The difficulty of the problem is illustrated by the lack of general results for the canonical case of uniform i.i.d. valuations in the unit interval [0, 1] even for a single bidder. In this work, we resolve this case for up to 6 items. We give an exact, analytic and intuitive way of computing the optimal prices; the solution is in closed-form, but involves roots of polynomials of degree equal to the number of items. We do so by providing a general framework for proving optimality of auctions for arbitrary continuous distributions, which we expect to be essential for generalizing Myerson's solution to many-items settings.
It is known that even in the simple case of one bidder, randomized auctions can perform strictly better than deterministic ones [Hart and Reny 2012; Hart and Nisan 2013; Manelli and Vincent 2006; Pycia 2006; Daskalakis et al. 2013b ]. Manelli and Vincent [2006] provide some sufficient conditions for deterministic auctions to be optimal for the single-buyer setting, but these are quite involved, in the form of functional inequalities that incorporate abstract partitions of the valuation space, and admittedly difficult to interpret. They were able to instantiate them though for the case of two and three uniform i.i.d. distributions and completely determine an optimal deterministic auction. For more items, it is not known whether the optimal auction is a deterministic one. Our results here, show that the optimal auction for up to 6 items is indeed deterministic. We conjecture that this is true for any number of items and a single bidder; we also conjecture that for more than one bidder the optimal auction is not deterministic. Hart and Nisan [2012] have provided a very simple sufficient condition in the case of two-item i.i.d. distributions for the deterministic full-bundle auction to be optimal and deploy it to show that this is the case for the equal-revenue distribution. Finally, Daskalakis et al. [2013b] were also recently able to deal with the special case of two items and independent (not necessarily identical) exponential distributions and give an exact solution, which in this case is randomized. Essentially this is all that was known up to now regarding exact, closed-form descriptions of the optimal auctions with continuous probability distributions, and all are restricted to settings for up to two and three items.
Given the difficulty of determining optimal auctions, Hart and Nisan [2012] study the performance of the two most straightforward deterministic mechanisms for the single-buyer setting, the one that sells all items in a full bundle and the one that sells each item independently. They provide solid and elegant approximation ratio guarantees (logarithmic with respect to the number of items) that hold universally for all product (independent) distributions, without even assuming standard regularity conditions (like e.g. in [Chawla et al. 2007; Manelli and Vincent 2006; Myerson 1981] ). Li and Yao [2013] further improved their results, by making them tight up to constants.
The difficulty of providing exact optimal solutions for multi-item settings is further supported by a recent computational hardness result by Daskalakis et al. [2013a] , where it is shown that even for a single buyer and two independent (but not identical) valuations with finite support of size 2, it is #P-hard to compute exactly the allocation function of an optimal auction. However this does not exclude the possibility of efficiently computing approximate solutions. In fact, Cai and Huang [2013] and Daskalakis and Weinberg [2012] have presented PTAS (polynomial-time approximation schemes) for i.i.d. settings.
Recently, at the time of developing this paper, Daskalakis et al. [2013b] published a duality approach to the problem, inspired by optimal transport theory. With its use, they gave optimal mechanisms for two-item settings for exponential distributions. Their approach assumes independent distributions that either have unbounded interval supports and decrease more steeply than 1/x 2 or bounded ones but they vanish to zero at the right bound of the interval. Thus their method cannot be applied to uniform valuations. Our aim is to provide a duality theory framework for multi-item optimal auctions, which is as general and clean as possible for many bidders and arbitrary joint distributions (not necessarily independent ones). For that reason, we deploy a "proof-from-scratch" approach directly inspired by linear programming duality which is easily comprehensible and applicable, and the reader will immediately feel familiar with. At their core, the two duality frameworks are based on similar ideas; although we expect our framework to have much wider applicability, we also believe that there will be special cases in which the framework of [Daskalakis et al. 2013b ] will be more suitable to apply.
Model and Notation
We denote the real unit interval by I = [0, 1], the nonnegative reals by R + = [0, ∞) and the positive ones by R * + . We consider auctions of n bidders who are interested in buying any subset of m items. For any positive integer m we use the notation [m] = {1, 2, . . . , m}. The value of bidder i for item j is in interval D i,j = [L i,j , H i,j ] ⊆ R + ; we denote by D i = m j=1 D i,j the hyperrectangle of all possible values of bidder i, and by D = n i=1 D i the space of all valuation inputs to the mechanism. The seller knows some probability distribution over D with an almost everywhere 1 (a.e.) differentiable density function f . Intervals D i,j need not be bounded, that is we allow H i,j ∈ R ∪ {∞}. Finally, we use the standard game theoretic notation x −j = (x 1 , x 2 . . . , x j−1 , x j+1 , . . . , x m ) to denote the resulting vector if we remove x's j-th coordinate. Then, x = (x −j , x j ). Similarly, x −(i,j) will denote all values of the n × m matrix x when we remove the (i, j)-th entry. For the most part of the paper, we restrict our attention to only one bidder. In this case, we drop the subscript i completely; for example, we write L j instead of L 1,j .
1.1.1. Mechanisms and Truthfulness. In this paper we study auction settings for selling m items to n bidders when bidder i ∈ [n] has a nonnegative valuation
. This is private information of the bidder, and intuitively represents the amount of money she is willing to pay to get this item. The seller has only some (incomplete) prior knowledge of the valuations x in the form of a joint probability distribution F over D from which x is drawn.
A direct revelation mechanism (auction) M = (a, p) on this setting consists of an allocation function a : D −→ I n×m , which satisfies i a i,j (x) ≤ 1 for all x ∈ D and all items j ∈ [m], paired with payment functions p i : D −→ R. We consider each bidder having additive valuations for the items, her "happiness" when she has (true) valuations x = (x −i , x i ) and reports x = (x −i , x i ) to the mechanism being captured by her utility function
the expected sum of the valuations she receives from the items she manages to purchase minus the payment she has to submit to the seller for this purchase. The player is completely rational and selfish, wanting to maximize her utility and that's why she will not hesitate to misreport x i instead of her private values x i if this is to give her a higher utility in (1). On the other hand, the seller's "happiness" is captured by the total revenue of the mechanism
which is a simple rearrangement of (1). It is standard in Mechanism Design to ask for auctions to respect the following two properties, for any player i ∈ [n]:
The IR constraint corresponds to the notion of voluntary participation, that is, a bidder cannot "harm" herself by truthfully taking part in the auction, while IC captures the fundamental property that truthtelling is a dominant strategy for the bidder in the underlying game, i.e. she will never receive a better utility by lying. Auctions that satisfy IC are also called truthful. From now on we will focus on truthful IR mechanisms, and so we will relax notation u i (x|x) to just u i (x), considering bidder's utility as a function u i : D −→ R + . The following is an elegant, extremely useful analytic characterization of truthful mechanisms due to Rochet [1985] . For proofs of this we recommend [Hart and Nisan 2012; Manelli and Vincent 2007] . THEOREM 1.1. An auction M = (a, p) is truthful (IC) if and only if the utility functions u i that induces have the following properties with respect to the i-th row coordinates, for all bidders i:
The allocation function a i is a subgradient of u i .
Theorem 1.1 establishes a kind of correspondence between truthful mechanisms and utility functions. Not only every auction induces well-defined utility functions for the bidders, but also conversely, given nonnegative convex functions that satisfy the properties of the theorem we can fully recover a corresponding mechanism from expressions (3) and (2).
problem of multi-dimensional optimal auction design. Notice that, given the characterization of Theorem 1.1, any single-bidder m-items deterministic and symmetric 2 auction corresponds to a utility function of the form
where p r is the price offered to the buyer for any bundle of r items, r ∈ [m].
1.1.3. Optimal Auctions. In this paper we study the problem of maximizing the expected seller's revenue based on his prior knowledge of the joint distribution F , given the IR and IC constraints, thus (by Theorem 1.1 and (2)) maximizing
over the space of nonnegative convex functions u on D having the properties
for a.e. x ∈ D and j ∈ [m].
OUTLINE OF OUR WORK
We give here an outline of our work which bypasses many technical issues but brings out a few central ideas. In the remaining sections we will shortly elaborate upon some of the topics discussed here, presenting in more detail some of the technical machinery used in the paper. A complete exposition, together with every missing proof and all intermediate lemmas can be found in the full version of the paper [Giannakopoulos and Koutsoupias 2014].
Duality for a Single Bidder
We first develop a general duality framework that applies to almost all interesting continuous probability distributions (Sect. 3). We view the problem of maximizing revenue as an optimization problem in which the unknown is the utility function u(x) of the bidders (Program (4)). There are two main restrictions imposed to these functions by truthfulness (see Theorem 1.1): the convexity restriction (the utility function u(x) must be convex with respect to the private values x of the bidder) and the gradient restriction (the derivatives of this function must be nonnegative and they have to be at most 1 for every item). Our first simplification is to drop the convexity constraint and keep only the gradient constraints. Surprisingly, the convexity constraint can be recovered for free from the optimal solution of the remaining constraints for a large class of distributions which includes the uniform distribution. We also drop the constraint that the allocation probabilities must be non-negative, a much more natural move, which again will not alter the optimal solution for the uniform distribution.
We view the resulting formulation as an infinite linear program with variable the utility function of the bidder. Its essential constraints (labeled by (z j ) in (4)) are that the derivatives for each item must be at most 1 and its objective is to maximize the expected value of ∇u(x) · x − u(x). We carefully rewrite the integral in (4) to bring it into a form which does not include any derivatives. Remarkably, Myerson's solution for the special case of one item, is based on a different rewriting of the system in which the primal variables are the derivatives of the utility, instead of the utility itself. In fact, since the allocation constraints involve exactly the derivatives, this is the most natural choice of primal variables. Unfortunately such an approach does not seem to work for the case of many items, since the partial derivatives are not independent functions and, if we treat them as such, we run the risk of violating the gradient constraints.
Having rewritten the original system in terms of the utility function u(x), we define a proper dual system with variables functions z j (x), one for every item (Program (5)). The dual constraints require that these functions take small values at the lower boundary of the domain and high values at the upper boundary of the domain. Furthermore, the objective is to minimize the sum of their integrals (Fig. 1 ). This would have been a trivial problem-for example, each z j could crawl at the minimum possible value until it reached the upper boundary and then shoot up to the required high value-had it not existed another constraint which requires that the sum of the derivatives of these functions is bounded above (and therefore the functions have to start rising sooner, to be able to reach the high value at the upper boundary).
Although the derivation of the dual program is natural and straightforward, there is no guarantee that the dual optimal value matches the primal optimal value, since these are infinite, indeed uncountable, linear programs. We directly show that the two systems satisfy the weak duality property (Lemma 3.2). This gives a general framework to prove optimality of a mechanism, by finding a dual solution and showing that their values match. Unfortunately, in most cases this is extremely hard, since the optimal value may be very complicated (for example, it turns out that the optimal value for the uniform distribution of m items consists of algebraic numbers of degree m). Instead we prove a complementarity theorem, which allows one to prove optimality by giving primal and dual solutions that satisfy the complementary slackness conditions. In fact, we prove a generalization of complementarity (Lemma 3.3), which allows us later to seek finite combinatorial solutions instead of continuous ones (Fig. 2) .
A similar duality, restricted to only one bidder and to a restricted set of probability distributions was used by Daskalakis et al. [2013b] . Their duality framework does not apply to the uniform distribution, the canonical example of continuous probability. Our approach manages to handle a much wider class of probability distributions, which includes the uniform distribution, by taking care of the boundary issues.
Duality for the Uniform Distribution
From this point on, we zoom in to the canonical problem for revenue maximization: we consider uniform distributions in [0, 1] m of m items and only one bidder. This may seem like a special case, and in fact it is; however, despite being the canonical case of a very important problem, it has been open since the work of Myerson [1981] , except for some specialized approaches which successfully resolved the problem for two and three items (mostly using complicated necessary conditions and rather involved computations). Our approach gives an elegant framework to solve these cases and provides a natural description and understanding of the solution. It also gives rise to beautiful problems; in particular, for the case of 2 items we know (but not include here) at least five different solutions for the problem, each with its own merits.
Our dual formulation of the problem can be rephrased as follows (see Remark 3.1): In the unit hypercube of m dimensions, we seek functions z j (x), one for each dimension; each z j starts at value 0 on the edge (0, x −j ) of the hypercube and rises up to value 1 at the opposite edge (1, x −j ) of the hypercube. Given that the functions cannot rise (a) Feasible solutions z1, z2 to the two-items dual program. Each function zj has to start at 0 on the entire axis xj = 0 and rise to 1. At no point of the 2-dimensional cube the sum of their slopes is allowed to exceed 3, and the objective is to keep them as low as possible, i.e. minimize the volume under their curves. feasible optimal z(x)
(b) For the special case of a single item, the dual feasible (nonnegative) function z has to start at 0 and rise to 1 or higher when x = 1, with a slope of at most 2. The optimal function minimizes the area below it. It is not difficult to see that the optimal solution is to remain at value 0 until x = 1/2 and then increase steadily to 1; the optimal dual objective is equal to the gray area. This corresponds exactly to the well-known optimal solution of Myerson with reserve price of 1/2. rapidly (more precisely, the sum of their slopes cannot exceed m + 1 at each point of the hypercube), find the functions with minimum sum of integrals. Alternatively, we can view it as a problem in the m + 1 hypercube: each function z j defines a hyper-surface which starts at the edge (0, x −j ) of the hypercube, ends at the opposite edge (0, x −j ) and they collectively cannot grow rapidly; we seek to minimize the sum of volumes beneath these surfaces (Fig. 1a ).
The Straight-Jacket Auction (SJA)
The dual system suggests in a natural way an auction, the Straight-Jacket Auction (SJA). We explain the intuition behind the auction and give a formal definition in Sect. 4. The auction SJA is defined so that for every bundle of items A, the price p |A| for A is determined by the requirement that the volume of the r-dimensional body in which the auction sells a non-empty subset of A is exactly equal to r/(m + 1). The aim of the remaining and more technical part of the paper is to develop the toolkit to prove that SJA is optimal for any number of items; however, we manage to prove optimality only for up to 6 items. The straightforward way for proving the optimality of SJA would be to find a pair of primal and dual solutions that have the same value. Although we know such explicit solutions for the case of two items, there does not seem to exist a natural solution of the dual program which can be easily described for more that two items. How then can we show optimality in such cases? We do not give an explicit dual solution, but we only show that a proper solution exists and rely on complementarity to show optimality.
Proof of Optimality of SJA
A central notion in our development is the notion of deficiency: the k-deficiency of a body S in m dimensions is |S| − k ( j |S [m]\{j} |), where S [m]\{j} denotes the projection of S on the hyperplane x j = 0 (this is an (m − 1)-dimensional body). In particular, we are interested in the deficiency of the subsets of U ∅ , the body in which the auction sells a non-empty bundle. The main tool for proving the optimality of SJA is the following: To show that the SJA is optimal it suffices to show that no set S of points inside U ∅ has positive 1 m+1 -deficiency (Theorem 4.8). The fact that this is sufficient is based mainly on the observation that finding a feasible dual solution is, in disguise, a perfect matching problem between the hypercube and its boundaries (taken with appropriate multiplicities). If Hall's condition for perfect matchings (see e.g. [Lovász and Plummer 1986 , Theorem 1.1.3]) could apply to infinite graphs, under some continuity assumptions the sufficiency of the above would be evident. However, Hall's theorem does not hold for infinite graphs in general [Aharoni 1991] and, even worse, the continuity assumptions seem hard to establish. We bypass both problems by considering an interesting discretized version of the problem that takes advantage of Hall's theorem and the piecewise continuity; we then apply approximate complementarity to prove optimality. A complete proof of Theorem 4.8 can be found in the full version of our paper [Giannakopoulos and Koutsoupias 2014, Theorem 4] , but some intuition for the case of 2 items can be found in Fig. 2 .
The technical core in our proof for the optimality of SJA consists of establishing that no positive deficiency subset of U ∅ exists. Let us call such a set a counterexample. To prove that no counterexample exists, we first argue that such a counterexample would have certain properties and then show that no counterexample with these properties exists. We first show that we can restrict our attention to special types of counterexamples, those that are upwards closed and symmetric (Lemma 5.3). Ideally, we would like to restrict our attention even further to box-like counterexamples, those that are the intersection of a box and U ∅ . This would restrict significantly the search of counterexamples, and in fact a well-known isoperimetric lemma by Loomis and Whitney [1949] , and a generalization by Bollobás and Thomason [1995] show that this is actually true when we remove the restriction that the counterexample must lie inside some fixed body (in our case, inside U ∅ ). Unfortunately, we can only establish this claim for 2 and 3 items; we don't know if this is true for higher dimensions. Instead, we prove a weaker version of it: we show that if a counterexample exists, it must be closed under taking the convex hull of all symmetric images of a point (Lemma 5.6). Furthermore, the requirement on deficiency provides a lower bound on the volume of the counterexample (Lemma 5.5).
By exploiting these properties, we show that no counterexample exists for 6 or fewer items (Theorem 4.7). The case of 4 or fewer items is straightforward, but the case of 5 items is qualitatively more challenging. The main reason for this difficulty, is that the optimal mechanism for 5 items never sells a bundle of 4 items (equivalently, the price for 4 items is equal to the price of 5 items). The case of 6 items is similar to the case of 5 items; the optimal mechanism does not sell any bundles of 5 items. However, all these cases are being treated in a unified way in the proof of the theorem that avoids tiresome case analysis. We must point out here that Theorem 4.7 is essentially the only ingredient of this paper whose proof does not work for more than 6 items.
The discretization of the allocation space and the structure of graph G used in the proof of Theorem 4.8, for m = 2 items. The space U ∅ where SJA sells at least one item (colored gray) does not properly align with the ε -discretization grid so we have to take a cover U * ∅ (outlined with the thick line, green in the color version of this paper). The boundaries B j ∪ B * j have width k + g(m)ε . The one on the right (perpendicular to the vertical axis) consists of ε -cubes holding color 1 (blue at the color version of the paper) and the one at the top color 2 (red). Edges run from every internal ε -cube, vertically towards the red exterior and horizontally towards the blue exterior. Notice, however, how the cube within the allocation subspace U {1} has only horizontal (blue) edges running out of it, since it is not allowed to use color 2 (red). That is due to the fact that item 2 is not sold within U {1} .
DUALITY
Motivated by traditional linear programming duality theory, we develop a duality theory framework that can be applied to the problem (4) of designing auctions with optimal expected revenue. By interpreting the derivatives as differences, we can view this as an (infinite) linear program and we can find its dual. The variables of the primal linear program are the values of the function u(x). The labels (z j (x)) and (s j (x)) on the constraints of Program (4) are the analog of the dual variables of a linear program.
To find its dual program, we first rewrite the objective function in terms of u instead of its derivatives. In particular, by integration by parts we have
to rewrite the objective of the primal program as
Notice that some of the above expressions make sense only for bounded domains (i.e., when H j is not infinity), but it is possible to extend the duality framework to unbounded domains, by carefully replacing these expressions with their limits when they exist or by appropriately truncating the probability distributions. For the main results in this work we deal only with bounded domains, but for completeness and future reference we provide a treatment of the general case in the full version of the paper [Giannakopoulos and Koutsoupias 2014, Appendix D] .
We also relax the original problem in two ways: we replace the convexity constraint by the much milder constraint of absolute continuity-absolute continuity allows us to express functions as integrals of their derivatives. We can restate this as follows: truthfulness in general imposes two conditions on the solution of allocating the items to bidders (see Theorem 1.1): the first condition is that the utility is convex; the second one is that the allocations must be gradients of the utility. We will also drop the constraints of nonnegative allocation probabilities (i.e., the (s j (x)) constraints in (4)).
In many cases, dropping these constraints might have no effect on the value of the program. However, there are cases in which these constraints are essential. In particular, they are needed even for the case of one item when the probability distributions are not regular. We give an in-depth discussion of this topic in [Giannakopoulos and Koutsoupias 2014, Appendix C] .
To find the dual program, we have to take extra care on the boundaries of the domain, since the derivatives correspond to differences from which one term is missing (the one that corresponds to the variables outside the domain). This is a point where our approach differs from that of Daskalakis et al. [2013b] , which applies only to special distributions and in particular it does not apply to the uniform distribution. Inside the domain, the dual constraint that corresponds to the primal variable u(x) is j ∂zj (x) xj ≤ (m + 1)f (x) + x · ∇f (x). So, the dual program that we propose is inf z1,...,zm D j∈ [m] The above derivation of this dual is used only for illustration and for explaining how we came up with it. None of the results relies on the way of deriving the dual problem. However, the derivation is useful for intuition and for importing traditional linear programming machinery to these infinite systems; for example, although we don't directly use any results from the theory of linear programming duality, we are motivated by it to prove similar connections between our primal and dual programs.
One can interpret this dual as follows: We seek m functions z j defined inside the hyperrectangle [L 1 , H 1 ] × · · · × [L m , H m ] such that -in the j-th direction, function z j starts at value (at most) L j f (L j , x −j ) and ends at value (at least) H j f (H j , x −j ); this must hold for all x −j . -at every point of the domain, the sum of the derivatives of functions z j cannot exceed (m + 1)f (x) + x · ∇f (x). -the sum of the integrals of these functions is minimized.
For a significant portion of this paper, we materialize this duality framework by applying it to the case of i.i.d. uniform distributions over the unit interval I m . Therefore, let's clearly state our dual constrains for ease of reference:
Remark 3.1 (Duality for Uniform Domains). The dual constraints (in Program (5)) for the m-items uniform i.i.d. setting over I m become:
A geometric interpretation of this dual for the case of one and two items, based on the previous discussion, can be found in Fig. 1. 
Duality and Complementarity
The way that we derived the dual system does not provide any rigorous connection with the original primal system. We now prove that this is indeed a weak dual, in the sense that the value of the dual minimization Program (5) cannot be less than the value of the primal Program. The proof is in the full version of the paper [Giannakopoulos and Koutsoupias 2014, Appendix A, Lemma 19] for the case of arbitrary many bidders n ≥ 1. We can use weak duality to show optimality: it suffices to have a pair of feasible primal and dual solutions that give the same value. In many cases, such as the case of uniform distributions, computing the optimal value is not easy or it may not be expressible in a closed form. In such a case, a useful tool to prove optimality is through complementarity. In fact, we will prove a slight generalization of traditional Linear Programming complementarity which will allow us later to discretize the domain and consider approximate solutions. Specifically, instead of requiring the product of primal and corresponding dual constraints to be zero, we generalize it to be bounded above by a constant: LEMMA 3.3 (COMPLEMENTARITY). Suppose that u(x) is a primal feasible solution and z j (x) is a dual feasible solution. Fix some parameter ε ≥ 0. If the following comple- Fig. 3 : The allocation spaces of the optimal SJA mechanisms for m = 2 and m = 3 items. The payments are given by p 1 = m m+1 , p 2 = 2m− √ 2 m+1 , and p 3 = 3 − 7.0971 m+1 . The mechanism sells at least one item within the gray areas U ∅ , and all items within the dark gray areas U [m] . If we flip around these dark gray areas by x → 1 − x, so that 1 is mapped to the origin 0, they are exactly the SIM-bodies defined in Sect. 6.1, for k = 1 m+1 . These SIM-bodies can be seen in Figs. 4a and 4b , respectively.
mentarity constraints hold for all j ∈ [m] and a.e. x ∈ D,
then the primal and dual values of Programs (4) and (5) differ by at most (3m + 1)ε. In particular, if the conditions are satisfied with ε = 0, both solutions are optimal.
The proof of this is also in [Giannakopoulos and Koutsoupias 2014, Appendix A].
THE STRAIGHT-JACKET AUCTION (SJA)
The duality conditions are not only useful in establishing optimality, but they in fact suggest the optimal auction in a natural way. We illustrate this by considering the case of 2 items. Starting from Fig. 1a , we need to find two functions z 1 and z 2 that satisfy the boundary constraints and the slope constraint. If we had only one function, say z 1 , the solution would be obvious and similar to the solution for one item (Fig. 1b) : z 1 (x) would be 0 up to x 1 = 2/3 and then increase with a slope of 3. But if we do the same for both functions z 1 and z 2 , we obtain an infeasible solution: in the square [2/3, 1]×[2/3, 1] the total slope would be 6 instead of 3. This implies that the functions need more space to grow; in fact, the area of growth need to be at least equal to the area of the square [2/3, 1] × [2/3, 1]. The natural way to get this space is to add a triangle of area 1/9 in the way indicated in the left part of Fig. 3 (the triangle defined by the lines x j = p 1 = 2/3 and x 1 + x 2 = p 2 ). We then seek a dual solution in which only z j grows in area U {j} and both functions grow in U {1,2} (Fig. 3) . The corresponding primal solution is that only item j is sold in U {j} and both items are sold in U {1,2} . The remarkable fact is that the optimal mechanism is completely determined by the obvious requirement that the area of the triangle must be (at least) equal to 1/9. To put it in another way: suppose that we knew that the optimal mechanism is deterministic; then the dual program requires that -the price p 1 for one item must satisfy p 1 ≥ 2/3 so that z 1 has enough space to grow from 0 to 1 with the maximum slope 3 -the price p 2 for the bundle of both items must be such that the area of the region
, in which the mechanism allocates at least one item, is at least 2/3 so that both functions have enough space to grow to 1
The central point of this work is that these necessary conditions (which we call slice conditions) are also sufficient. This intuition naturally extends to more items: the price for a bundle of r items is determined by the slice condition that the r-dimensional volume in which the auction sells at least one item of the bundle is exactly equal to r/(m + 1).
Using this intuition, we define here the Straight-Jacket Auction (SJA). The auction is deterministic and symmetric; as such, it is defined by a payment vector
is the price offered by the auction to the bidder for every subset of r items, r ∈ [m]. We will drop the superscript when there is no confusion about the number of available items. The utility of the bidder is then given by u(x) = max J⊆[m] j∈J x j − p |J| . The prices are defined by the slice conditions. For a subset of items J ⊆ [m], let Pr(J, x −J ) be the probability that at least one item in J is sold when the remaining items have values x −J . The r-th dimensional slice condition is that for every J with |J| = r and every x −J : Pr(J, x −J ) ≥ |J|/(m + 1). The SJA is the deterministic auction which satisfies the slice conditions for all dimensions as tightly as possible (hence its name), in the following sense: determine the prices p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p m in this order so that, having fixed the previous ones, select p r as maximum as possible to satisfy all rdimensional slice conditions. In particular, this guarantees that the m-dimensional slice is tight, or equivalently, that the probability that at least one item is sold is m/(m + 1).
Definition 4.1 (Straight-Jacket Auction (SJA)). SJA for m items is the deterministic symmetric auction whose prices p 
where k = 1/(m + 1). In words, p (m) r is selected so that the probability of selling no item when r values are drawn from the uniform probability distribution (and the remaining values of the m items are set to 0) is equal to 1 − r · k. We will refer to constraints (6) as slice conditions.
If we take the complement of the above probability, an equivalent definition would be to ask for the probability of selling at least one of items [r] , when all other bids for items [r + 1...m] are fixed to zero, to be rk.
The specific value on the right-hand side of (6) depends on the parameter k, which, in turn, depends on the total number of items m; the exact dependence arises from the specific values of the primal and dual program. It is however useful in providing a unifying approach to carry out the discussion and analysis for an arbitrary (albeit small, k ≤ 1 m+1 ) parameter k and to plug in the specific value k = 1/(m + 1) only when this is absolutely necessary.
It is not immediate that SJA is a well-defined auction. In order for the auction to be well-defined, there should be prices p (m) r that satisfy (6). For m ≤ 6, the main technical result of this work is showing that the auction is both well-defined and optimal: THEOREM 4.2. The Straight-Jacket Auction mechanism is well-defined and optimal for uniform i.i.d. valuations, for up to 6 items.
Our proof of this theorem relies significantly on the geometry of these mechanisms. We conjecture that the theorem holds for any number of items:
CONJECTURE. The Straight-Jacket Auction mechanism is well-defined and optimal for uniform i.i.d. valuations and any number of items.
Here is how to use the slice conditions (6) to compute the prices of SJA: The 1dimensional condition on a 1-dimensional hypercube simply means that p (m) 1 = 1 − 1/(m + 1), because we only have condition x 1 < p (m) 1 . The 2-dimensional condition on a 2-dimensional boundary requires that the region {x : x 1 + x 2 < p 2 and x 1 < p 1 and x 2 < p 1 } inside the unit square must have area equal to 1 − 2/(m + 1). In other words, we want to find where to move the line x 1 + x 2 = p 2 so that the area that it cuts satisfies the slice condition (in the left Fig. 3 , U {1} , U {2} , and U {1,2} have total volume 2/(m+1)); this gives p 2 = 2−(2+ √ 2)/(m+1). We can proceed in the same way to higher dimensions, and exact, analytic computation of these values for up to r = 6 is given in the full version of the paper [Giannakopoulos and Koutsoupias 2014, Appendix E], but we also list them below for quick reference. In the following we will often use the transformation
so that prices will be determined with respect to some parameters µ r . It will be algebraically convenient to also assume p 0 = 0.
-For r ≤ 4 and any number of items m ≥ r: In this section we gather the key elements that form the backbone of our proof for the optimality of the SJA mechanism. In the following we denote by U (m) J We next define the notion of deficiency of a body, which is one of the key ingredients in this paper:
Definition 4.4 (Deficiency). For any k ∈ R * + , we will call k-deficiency of a body A ⊆ R m + the quantity
This is inspired by the deficiency notion in bipartite graphs defined by Ore [1955] .
Here we extend it to the continuous settings, trying to capture how large a body is with respect to its projections. A useful, trivial to prove property of the deficiency function is that it is supermodular.
Definition 4.5 (SIM-bodies). For positive α 1 ≤ · · · ≤ α r , let
We call these SIM-bodies. We will also use the following notation q · Λ(α 1 , . . . , α r ) ≡ Λ(q · α 1 , . . . , q · α r ) for any positive real q.
It turns out that SIM-bodies (see Fig. 4 ) are essentially the building blocks of the allocation space of SJA:
LEMMA 4.6. Every non-empty slice U
The parameters λ (m) r depend on the payments of the SJA mechanism (particularly, on the µ (m) r 's in (7)) and are given by (10). Next we show the following theorem, which is essentially the only ingredient of this paper whose proof does not work for more than 6 items. In a way it demonstrates the maximality of the deficiency of the particular critical SIM-bodies Λ(λ 1 , . . . , λ r ), in the sense that they cannot contain subsets that have greater deficiency than themselves: Finally, we prove our main tool to show that SJA is optimal. It achieves to utilize the fact that the allocation space of SJA has no positive deficiency subsets in a combinatorial way: 
BODIES AND DEFICIENCIES
We now present some key ideas from the geometric theory that captures the critical structural properties of SJA auctions. First we will need to establish some notation and formally define some notions.
For any m-dimensional body A ⊆ R m + we will denote its volume simply by |A| ≡ µ(A) (where µ is the standard m-dimensional Lebesgue measure). For any index set J ⊆ [m], the projection of A with respect to the J coordinates is defined as A [m]\J ≡ {x −J | x ∈ A } and is the remaining body of A if we "delete" coordinates J. For any r ∈ [m], index set J ⊆ [m] with |J| = m − r and t ∈ R m−r + we define the slice of A above the point t with respect to coordinates J as A| J:t ≡ {x −J | x ∈ A ∧ x J = t }. It is the remaining of the body A if we fix a vector t at coordinates J. We will say that a body A is downwards closed if for any point of A, all points below it are also contained in A: y ∈ A for all y ∈ R m + with y ≤ x. Body A will be called symmetric if it contains all permutations of its elements. If an m-dimensional body A is symmetric then one can define its width to be the length of its projection towards any axis: w(A) ≡ |A {j} | for any j ∈ [m]. Finally, we describe a property that will play a key role in the following:
Definition 5.1 (p-closure). We will say that a body A is p-closed if it contains the convex hull of the permutations of any of its elements.
Notice that any p-closed body must be symmetric (but not necessarily convex) and that any convex symmetric body is p-closed.
The next lemma tells us that by "leaving gaps" between the points of bodies and the orthant's faces can only reduce the deficiency.
LEMMA 5.2. For any bodies A, B such that B ⊆ A and A being downwards closed, there exists a downwards closed sub-bodyB ⊆ A such that δ(B) ≥ δ(B).
The supermodularity of deficiency functions immediately implies that if bodies A 1 , A 2 ⊆ S are of maximum deficiency (within S), then both their union and intersection are also of maximum deficiency. Based on this, the following can be shown: LEMMA 5.3. For any downwards closed and symmetric body A, there is a maximum volume sub-body of A of maximum deficiency, which is also downwards closed and symmetric.
The next lemma describes how global maximum deficiency implies also a kind of local one:
LEMMA 5.4. Let A ⊆ S be a maximum deficiency body (within S). Then, every slice of A must have nonnegative deficiency and must not contain sub-slices with higher deficiency.
As a result of the above lemma we get some properties of maximum deficiency subbodies, which imply that these bodies must be "large enough" (Lemma 5.5) and also demonstrate some kind of "symmetric convexity" (p-closure Lemma 5.6, Definition 5.1). To do this we also utilize an inequality that brings together volumes and projections of bodies, due to Loomis and Whitney [1949] . For more details we point the interested reader to the full version [Giannakopoulos and Koutsoupias 2014, Sect. 5] LEMMA 5.5. If A is a nonempty symmetric, downwards closed body with nonnegative deficiency then it must contain the point (k, 2k, . . . , mk). More generally, it must contain the point (k, 2k, . . . , (m − 1)k, w(A)).
LEMMA 5.6 (P-CLOSURE). Let A ⊆ S be a maximum volume sub-body of S of maximum deficiency and let S be p-closed. Then every slice of A (including A itself) must be p-closed (see Definition 5.1).
DECOMPOSITION OF SJA INTO SIM-BODIES

SIM-bodies
Remember that in Definition 4.5 we introduced the notion of a SIM-body Λ(α 1 , . . . , α r ): for parameters α 1 ≤ · · · ≤ α r , it is the set of all vectors x ∈ R r + satisfying conditions j∈J x j ≤ r j=r−|J|+1 α j for all J ⊆ [r]. The geometry of the allocation space of the SJA mechanisms (see Fig. 3 ) naturally gives rise to this family of bodies. Their importance and connection with the structure of the SJA mechanisms will become evident in Sect. 6.2 where we prove Lemma 4.6. The intuition behind the naming becomes obvious if one looks at Fig. 4a . By the way SIM-bodies are defined, one can immediately see that they are downwards closed, symmetric and convex polytopes. Thus, they are also p-closed. SIM-bodies demonstrate some inherently recursive and symmetric properties, some of which can be seen in Fig. 4 . A formal and complete statement of these properties can be found in [Giannakopoulos and Koutsoupias 2014, Lemma 13 ].
